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For the first time in modem history, free trade coexists with free finance. Free 
trade and free finance (defined as the deregulation and internationalization of 
banking and finance) are not mutually reinforcing, but cause a mismatch 
between the demand and supply of financial instruments - the savers’ preference 
for marketable instruments is increasing at a time when the borrowers’ demand 
for transaction-specific instruments is increasing. This mismatch potentially hurts 
small firms and local interests most. What can they do about it? It depends on 
state institutions. The more centralized the state, the fewer opportunities 
available to potential losers to curb free finance. As a result, free finance is most 
successful in centralized countries, where resistance to free finance is least 
strongly felt. This hypothesis is systematically tested on a sample of OECD 
countries.
' 1 am pleased to acknowledge the research assistance of Elisabeth Paulet and Benoit Friguet. 
I wish to thank Dale Murphy, Beth Simmons, and two anonymous reviewers for their 
comments. Earlier versions of this essay were presented at the Annual Meeting of the 
International Studies Association. Minneapolis, March 1998, the working group on 
International Trade at the European University Institute, April 1998, and the Annual Meeting 
of the American Political Science Association in Boston, September 1998. This research was 





















































































































































































This is not the first time that national financial markets are becoming more 
global. They reached a similar, if not more advanced, state of mutual 
dependence during the classic era of the Gold Standard.1 What is unique about 
the last three decades of the Twentieth Century is the simultaneity of growing 
financial openness and freer trade - trade was not free under the Gold Standard. 
Free trade and free finance are defined as the opening to domestic and 
international competition of respectively the product and capital markets.' In 
theory, free trade and free finance are mutually reinforcing. Domestic and 
international competition in finance allow firms to reduce costs of production 
and meet foreign competition in goods markets. Cheaper goods, in turn, allow 
consumers to save more, increasing the supply and further reducing the cost of 
capital. In practice, however, the relation between financial openness and free 
trade, I argue, is not as virtuous as it first seems to be, but generates a 
discrepancy. Borrowers want more transaction-specific financial instruments 
whereas savers want more marketable financial instruments. As a result, 
financial globalization is not neutral, but has redistributional effects. It has the 
potential, I argue, to harm the small and the local. Consequently, interests that 
are potentially losing from market dynamics face two options. They may defer 
to market forces; or they may resist such forces, lobbying for regulatory 
protection to keep globalization in check. Which option do they typically 
choose?
This question is central to the literature on financial globalization.3 A 
first wave of studies announced that financial globalization benefited large 
multinational companies and other transnational actors at the expense of the 
state and, thus, of interests that exclusively rely on national political 
representation to defend their rights.4 A second wave found that the opposite 
was actually occurring; that globalization, to paraphrase Alan Milward’s 
felicitous formula about Europeanization, “rescued the state.” States used 
financial deregulation - and the associated re-regulation at the supranational 
level - to claim the regulation of activities until then the competence of local 
governments and professional organizations.5 With state power thus intact, 
financial internationalization should be, according to this approach, unlikely to 
proceed at the expense of state-dependent interests.
The present work offers a more nuanced view of reality. Current data 
show that OECD countries are not equally involved in financial globalization.6 
I intend to explain this variation in terms of political coalitions and political 
institutions.7 1 model financial globalization as a market outcome, shaped by a 
non-market process - lobbying for a government policy. The analysis rests on a 



























































































decision process. In the first period, the government is confronted with an 
exogenous trend (be it a technical innovation, a fashion, or else) that promises 
to ease internationalization in the second period if the trend is allowed to 
proceed. If so allowed, the degree of openness of the capital market will be 
higher in the second period than in the first. If the trend instead is checked, the 
degree of openness will remain unchanged. The potential trend toward 
globalization has distributional consequences that actors anticipate and for or 
against which they mobilize according to whether they expect to win or lose. 
The institutional makeup influences political competition between the two 
camps. State centralization makes the potential winners of globalization the 
likely winners of the political competition. Decentralization, in contrast, gives 
an edge to the potential losers. The political competition determines the policy 
outcome, and the policy outcome determines the market outcome - the relative 
market share of each camp, the relative importance of markets in the financing 
of investment, and the degree of dependence on the world financial market. 
This is a rational-expectations model in which all variables but one - state 
institutions - are endogenous.8
The present study makes three related claims. First, the joint trends 
toward free trade and free finance have the potential to cause a mismatch 
between the demand and supply of financial instruments. Second, this 
mismatch threatens to hurt small banks, small firms, and local interests most. 
Third, free finance (holding free trade constant), is more likely to obtain in 
centralized countries, where the potential losers of globalization tend to be 
politically weaker, than in decentralized countries, where these potential losers 
are politically stronger. The study systematically tests aspects of each claim 
against various subsets of OECD countries.
The first three sections develop the argument that current trends in 
finance and trade cause a mismatch between the demand and supply of 
financial instruments. The fourth section develops the territorial effects of free 
trade. A fifth section maps the potential winners and losers, and a sixth, the 
losers' nonmarket options. The penultimate section derives testable hypotheses 
and confront them with OECD reality. A concluding section recalls, and 
expands on, the findings.
Transaction-Specific and Marketable Financial Instruments
Capital can be allocated in two analytically distinct ways. Capital can be 
allocated through an efficient spot market, characterized by little information 




























































































prices. Alternatively, capital can be allocated through a network - a long-term 
relationship enforced by institutional, social, cultural, or mere reputational 
devices. The long-term horizon of the network relationship makes possible the 
transfer of private information from the borrower to the lender; it also prevents 
the lender from indulging in monopolistic pricing, as each side is deterred from 
short-term opportunism by the desire to preserve the long-term relationship.
Two types of lender-borrower network are encountered in OECD 
countries. A first type is the classic German model of universal banking, in 
which bank and firm are engaged in a long-term, oligopolistic relation with 
each other. One bank serves all the financial needs of its clients “from cradle to 
grave.” Bankers play an active role in the management of the firm, and use 
their financial clout to help firms belonging to the same sector cartelize that 
sector.9 Information asymmetry and rent seeking are minimized, because bank 
and firm owners are socially close, and because the bank’s future business 
relies entirely on the success of its clients. Roughly equivalent versions of this 
model are the Japanese “Keiretsu” and the French “Groupe,” featuring cross­
shareholding among a handful of firms that are involved in various sectors and 
are clustered around one bank.10
The second type of financial network is the Italian industrial district, 
also present in various forms in other countries. The industrial district, is a 
network of small, low-capitalized, and versatile enterprises, working together 
to spread risk, offer a greater diversity of products, and maintain a skilled 
workforce." Firms in industrial districts rely on local municipalities, guilds, 
and trade associations to supply them with the necessary externalities - 
vocational training, price and wage regulation, marketing facilities, quality 
normalization. Capital is typically supplied by one or two local banks, usually 
nonprofit, such as a savings bank working in association with a credit 
cooperative, each enjoying a local monopoly. Information asymmetry and rent 
seeking are minimized because of community ties, geographic proximity, and 
the dependence of bank’s profits on the district’s fortune.12
Financial instruments used in market-mediated transactions are by 
definition marketable. The price reflects the true value of the investment; any 
saver can purchase it. In contrast, financial instruments used in network-based 
transactions are transaction-specific; the price includes information that is only 
known to the parties to the transaction. The resulting financial instrument (a 





























































































A marketable instrument offers the advantage of being easily disposable. 
The liquidity risk that is borne by its holder is virtually nil, since, short of a 
market crash, there exists a second-hand market on which the instrument can 
be immediately sold off. A transaction-specific instrument, in contrast, cannot 
be liquidated, except at an unreasonable loss, but must be held until maturity. 
The liquidity risk of a transaction-specific instrument is thus high.
Neither instrument is a priori superior to the other. On the one hand, 
markets are unable to gather and transmit information when one side of the 
contract has both an interest in, and the possibility of, hiding information, or 
when either side manipulates prices. Networks, in contrast, give lenders (banks 
usually) access to private information because their relations with borrowers 
are long-term and impregnated with reputation and personal trust. On the other 
hand, markets are more efficient at pricing products for which there exists 
sufficient information or guarantees, provided that these products occur in high 
volume. In sum, marketable and transaction-specific instruments are 
specialized instruments; marketable instruments are good for financing the 
known and numerous, whereas transaction-specific instruments are better 
adapted to the less visible and more qualitative.
What matters is that the relative supply of each type of instrument 
matches the relative demand. I argue that the twofold trend toward free trade 
and free finance causes a mismatch - free finance increases lenders’ supply of 
marketable instruments, whereas free trade raises borrowers’ demand for 
transaction-specific instruments.
Free Finance and the Declining Supply of Transaction-Specific 
Instruments
A greater proportion of financing is done across borders today than in 1960. A 
greater proportion is also done through securities markets than through bank 
lending and borrowing (this second trend is commonly referred to in the 
specialized literature as “securitization” or “disintermediation”).
The trend toward free finance started with the opening of the 
"Euromarkets" in the 1960s. Euromarkets developed free of bank reserve 
requirements and interest rate regulation, and were used by large banks 
throughout the world as a means to evade the vicious squeeze to which they 
were subject at home by governments intent on keeping interest rates 
artificially low to promote home investment while using bank reserve 




























































































successfully lobbied for the loosening of the interwar regulatory straitjacket, 
which restricted their activity to short-term lending. They had the support of 
their respective central bank, who grew disturbed at the negative impact of the 
commercial banks’ decline on the efficiency of monetary policy, of which the 
banks served as conduit. The tax cuts that sanctioned the neo-liberal reforms of 
the 1980s forced state treasuries to finance their growing debt on the bond 
market. To ease the financing of the debt, treasuries pursued deflationary 
policies, thereby reviving the moribund bond market for corporate borrowers at 
the expense of bank lending. The privatization of state-owned companies in 
European countries then led governments to promote stock markets, passing 
legislation making the purchase of securities more attractive to households. 
The ongoing privatization of pensions plans in some OECD countries, 
associated with a deep-seated ageing of populations, is responsible for the 
growing assets of insurance companies and pension funds.14
Faced with disintermediation - that is, the replacement of loans and 
deposits by securities - commercial banks (along with savings banks) 
successfully lobbied for a piece of the securities business. The separation 
between commercial banks and securities houses was abolished in France, 
Belgium, Sweden, and Italy. Still on paper in the United States, the Glass- 
Steagall prohibition was partially emptied from its content by the FED during 
the 1980s.15 Moreover, following Wall Street’s “Big Bang,” stock-market rates 
and membership were freed almost everywhere in OECD world.16 In all cases, 
entry was also extended to foreigners. More recently, some governments have 
opened the insurance market to banks. In a majority of OECD countries, 
financial institutions already enjoy the right to sell the mix of financial 
products they want.
Although unmistakable, the trend toward internationalization and 
securitization is not universal. A glance at FDI inflows weighted by GDP 
shows a longitudinal increase over time for some, but not all, OECD countries 
(see Graph 1). But before I venture to explain this rising divergence, I need 
first to explore what the distributional effects of free finance are. I argue in the 
remainder of this section that internationalization and securitization have two 
negative consequences for banks: (1) they raise the level of competition, 
reducing profit margins; (2) they increase bank vulnerability to market 
volatility. Banks do typically respond to this dual threat by embracing a 
strategy of product standardization and amalgamation. This move, though quite 
functional for the banks, has negative consequences for investors and 
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Competition eliminates rents, putting a downward pressure on bank 
profit.17 Banks cannot easily resort to product diversification to restore (or 
prevent the compression of), even temporarily, their profit margins. There are 
few R&D rents in banking. As Tony Porter (1993: 93) writes, “new products 
mature and bank hierarchies are being replaced with arm’s length transactions 
in these instruments... A wholesale market in swaps has developed, promoted 
by investment banks, and was so successful that everyone joined in.” Only the 
high end of investment banking is escaping the commodification that has 
followed the commercial banks’ entry in securities markets - the highly 
personalized businesses, such as very large stock and bond flotation, private 
placements, cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions, and designer-driven 
derivative products, to name a few. Such is the reason why the large 
commercial banks have been acquiring well-known investment banks.18 This is 
where the personalized and lucrative deals still are. There is limited room at 
the top, however.
A second source of concern is real interest rate volatility. With 
households seeking the higher (in the long-run) returns of securities markets, 
banks are no longer able to finance their activity through deposits alone, but 
must also borrow on the international money market. So doing, they are subject 
to interest rate volatility, which, contrary to monetarists’ predictions, has 
increased since markets have been allowed to set interest rates. They also have 
to worry about their credit rating, which determines the price they pay. Banks, 
therefore, have a growing preference for assets that are easily disposable, not 
only to be able to unload them in case of interest hike, but also because 
disposable assets have a market value that is directly - and more favorably - 
assessable by Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s.
Banks can logically respond (and, in many cases, have actually 
responded) to the twofold threat of losses and volatility by pursing a strategy 
of product (asset) standardization. Asset standardization makes bank assets 
less risky and more valuable, for more easily disposable. This explains the 
recent success of “asset-backed securities,” by which banks “securitize” some 
of their loans. Banks typically collect a large portfolio of bank loans that are 
then used as collateral for new bonds. It works because markets can price 
certain bank loans better - and thus higher - than single banks, provided, first, 
that these loans occur in large pools for which past experience can be used to 
predict default rates and, second, that claims over collateral be easily 
transferable. Only a few categories of bank assets so far meet these 
requirements; they are credit card receivables, corporate receivables, 




























































































Standardization decreases information requirements, thus making mass- 
production - the processing of a high volume of instruments at paper-thin 
profit margins - a viable strategy. Banks typically increase volume by 
expanding their existing distribution networks, mostly through acquisition, due 
to the large fixed costs sunk into branch networks.20 Bank amalgamation 
increases the deposit and retailing base of the bank, improving its placement 
facilities and enabling it to play a role in the largest and most profitable issues, 
international especially. There are indeed substantial scale economies in 
investment banking, the cost of a large issue being no significantly higher than 
that of a small issue.21
Although quite functional from a banker’s perspective, bank 
concentration and asset standardization have negative implications for market 
efficiency. Bank concentration and asset standardization eliminate the 
comparative advantage that banks have over markets in overcoming 
information asymmetry. Recall from the first section that the long-term 
character of a relationship between a bank and a firm is what allows the bank 
to reduce the information asymmetry otherwise typical of contracts in which 
one side has an interest in hiding information. As banks become more 
dependent on securities markets, both to procure resources and dispose of 
assets, they have an incentive to neglect loans that are firm-specific, illiquid, 
and that should invariably drag their credit ratings down. Indeed, relational 
information (the private information that a bank is able to gather on a firm 
through a long-term relationship with that firm) does not readily transfer to 
other creditors, thereby making these loans’ market value - the only value that 
Standard & Poor’s fully recognizes when rating a bank - systematically inferior 
to their real value.22 Banks also have an interest in eliminating past cross­
subsidization between large and small loans. Finally, the trend toward bank 
concentration makes monitoring through physical presence at board meetings 
impractical for the small and medium-size firms, for bankers are able to attend 
only so many board meetings in a year, preferably those of the largest 
companies.
The banks’ lesser capacity to reduce information asymmetry is not 
compensated by a greater aptitude of markets to do so. Improvements in 
information technology may facilitate the dissemination of public information; 
more information may be available on borrowers for whom there is 
information to begin with. But they do little for the gathering of relational 
information. There is no one else, besides bankers, to monitor firms. 
Institutional investors typically hold highly diversified portfolios with small 




























































































assume that role.2’ Credit-rating institutions such as Moody’s and Standard & 
Poor's are not designed to gather relational information.
I have argued that free finance is likely to cause a surge in competition 
that would make the financial sector less able to supply transaction-specific 
instruments to the non financial sector. This proposition can be tested. Testable 
too is the related proposition that the banks that are best able to take advantage 
of securitization and internationalization (e.g., the largest banks) are likely to 
grow relative to those that depend on local, small business. These two 
propositions will be tested when the entire story is told. In what follows, I 
explain why the declining supply of transaction-specific instruments is 
unlikely to be matched by a declining demand.
Free Trade and the Rising Demand for Transaction-Specific Instruments
Free trade increases competition among firms, cutting into their profit margins 
and forcing them to develop a competitive advantage. Competitive advantage 
can be had in the form of either lower costs or differentiated products that 
command premium prices. Cost-cutting through process change, 
subcontracting, sourcing factors abroad, flexible wages and working hours can 
only offer temporary relief to a handful of pacesetters, before teeing off a new - 
and stiffer - round of price-cutting. Product differentiation is a more 
sustainable strategy.24 Product differentiation is an attempt to carve a niche in a 
given product market, which the firm then tries to comer and exploit to restore 
its profit margin. Ways of doing so range from cosmetic repackaging to actual 
innovation, with the latter being more effective. But even product 
differentiation only allows the successful firm to achieve no more than a 
temporary advantage, lasting the time it takes for competitors either to 
replicate or overcome this advantage. The profitable firms are those that are 
flexible enough to produce a large and continuously changing panoply of 
products that markets want, in large quantity, at low cost, within (and for) a 
short amount of time.
The present trend toward product differentiation (and flexible 
production) is to be contrasted with the emphasis on mass production that 
obtained in the oligopolistic and protectionist markets of the past. Organized 
around the production of “long runs” of a handful of products, mass- 
production firms proved unable to retool cheaply and timely. New forms of 
organization have emerged to match the new requisite of flexible 
differentiation. One of them is the industrial district, already mentioned.25 The 




























































































the old large company, composed of the equivalent of a lean holding company 
dealing with its subsidiaries as if they were independent subcontractors.26
The shift toward networking, common to small and large firms alike, 
reflects the fact that market differentiation through product innovation (and 
flexible production) is both costly and risky. R&D costs have a steep fixed 
component, while returns on R&D are both probabilistic and afflicted with 
externalities - they diffuse rapidly.27 Fixed cost, probabilistic returns, and 
externalities are three good reasons for firms to diversify the portfolio of 
products containing the same technological know-how. Rather than building 
larger research departments, firms are more inclined to spread risk with other 
firms and local governments.28
Networked or not, however, today's firms, unlike their ancestors, have a 
continuous need for external capital. They cannot establish market power by 
sinking capital into physical assets that can be used as partial collateral, but 
instead invest in disembodied knowledge, void of market value, unusable as 
collateral, and which can only be financed by owners (through retained 
earnings or through the issuance of new stocks) or by members of a common 
network. Firms cannot raise most of their risk capital on their own through 
monopolistic pricing, but instead are in a much greater need of an external 
source, on which they can rely if, for whatever reason, their capacity to extract 
rents momentarily fails to deliver the sums that are needed to stay in the race 
for new products.
Hence, free trade forces firms seek to do the same through product 
diversification (and flexible production), at the same time that free finance 
forces banks to regain a competitive advantage through product 
standardization (and concentration), causing a potential mismatch between the 
relative supply of, and demand for, transaction-specific instruments.
Can’t this mismatch be solved through the price mechanism? One could 
imagine that the excess demand for bank loans would push interest rates 
upward enough to re-launch bank intermediation. Simultaneously, if too much 
savings are chasing too few securitized assets, profit margins on such 
instruments should fall below a point where it would become profitable for 
banks to invest in unsecuritized debt. Surely, no trend away from equilibrium 
is sustainable in the long run; there is always a point past which an adjustment 
must occur. Where this clearing point lies is unknown. What is certain, 
however, is that this clearing point will have to clear more than the lender- 
borrower market. It will also have to clear the political market. For as long as 




























































































bank accounts to security funds, banks will have a vested interest to prefer 
marketable paper to intermediation. Similarly, as long as governments are bent 
on lowering trade barriers, product markets will grow uncertain, forcing small 
companies to adopt ever riskier financial arrangements. Adjustment may take a 
form other than a change in the price of financial instruments; bankruptcy and 
industrial concentration are possible alternative.
In the next section, I consider a related, yet analytically distinct, effect of 
free trade - agglomeration.
Free Trade and Economies of Agglomeration
There is an emerging consensus across disciplines that modem production has 
a territorial, local dimension. Michael Porter writes that “more open global 
competition makes the home base more, not less, important.”29 Paul Krugman 
shows, in contrast to the prevailing assumption that the decline in 
transportation costs makes firms indifferent to localization, that it makes them 
want to agglomerate.30 It is a fact that multinational firms locate their most 
advanced technological capacities in their home countries.31 Students of 
flexible specialization stress the importance of geographical concentration in 
attracting talented people and the role of proximity in the production of 
learning and innovation.3'  As Ash Amin and Nigel Thrift put it well, “the 
world economy may have become decentralized, but it is not necessarily 
becoming decentered.”33 In sum, firms’ greater reliance on knowledge-based 
assets, also a consequence of freer trade, creates economies of agglomeration.
Economies of agglomeration potentially have severe redistributional 
consequences for local districts. Those with an already dense industrial base 
may see it further reinforced, while those with a weak one risk to lose what 
they have, and those without any might remain barren. The most favored areas 
are those located around large metropolitan regions. Big cities, according to 
Todtling, “still have superior locational conditions such as good transportation 
and communications networks, high levels of education, large number of 
research institutions, and highly qualified labor.”34 Less favored are the 




























































































Potential Winners and Losers
So far, I have sketched a global trend, paying no attention to cross-national 
variations. It is now the time to ask why some countries, Germany for instance, 
are resisting financial globalization. The answer, I argue, is that the expected 
redistributional consequences of financial globalization are causing potential 
losers to lobby against it. But not all potential losers enjoy the political power 
to mount a successful blocking campaign. I will establish a map of potential 
losers and winners in this section and then address the power issue in the next 
section.
What is the most appropriate way of categorizing interests - along factor, 
sector, size, or geographic lines?35 It is generally assumed that financial 
globalization favors capital at the expense of labor because it makes capital 
relatively more mobile than labor.36 Yet, financial globalization does not pit 
capital against labor. Capital exists in two forms - saved and vested. It is saved 
capital that financial globalization has made more mobile by extending its 
range of action from the nation to the world. But once invested in buildings 
and machines, capital is hardly more mobile today than it was thirty years ago. 
Owners of vested capital, be they small entrepreneurs or loyal stockholders, are 
as much in need of attracting liquid capital than labor is. If they have the 
wherewithal to raise funds in global markets, they are likely to embrace 
financial globalization. If they instead are tightly dependent on bank loans, 
they are likely to blame their financial difficulties on globalization.
Surely, firms enjoy greater latitude to contain wage pressures than in the 
past. They can threaten to relocate production in wage heavens - the famous 
“giant sucking sound” that Ross Perot attributed to the North American Free 
Trade Agreement. This real difference, however, is not so much the 
consequence of financial globalization than of product globalization - free 
trade - which makes outsourcing possible. More importantly, one must be 
careful to differentiate workers according to skill levels. Skilled workers 
benefit from free trade, for free trade compels firms to strengthen their R&D 
departments and build the quality circles that are a prerequisite to the 
successful pursuit of product differentiation.
Financial globalization does not reinforce, but breaks sectoral solidarity. 
Financial globalization discriminates between firms that have the capacity to 
finance innovation on their own or by borrowing on capital markets and firms 
that are dependent on bank loans. The former tend to be large companies, the 




























































































favor banks at the expense of non-financial sectors either. Banks handle 
greater volumes, but at lower profit margins.
Financial globalization should pit borrowers against savers. In creditor 
countries, free finance opens up new investment opportunities to domestic 
savers, while forcing local borrowers to compete with foreign borrowers and 
remunerate external capital better. The situation is the exact reverse in debtor 
countries. However, the saver-borrower cleavage offers little edge on the 
countries included in this study - the advanced subset of the OECD club. With 
most foreign investment occurring between these countries and most of these 
countries importing as much capital as they export, it is impossible to say 
without ambiguity whether financial globalization favors savers or borrowers.
The most relevant cleavage, I argue, is the core-periphery cleavage, 
pitting a center populated with a few large players against a periphery 
constituted of smaller actors. The core-periphery cleavage is a composite of 
two analytically distinct dimensions - size and territory - reflecting the joint 
impact of free finance and free trade. Free finance benefits the big at the 
expense of the small. Among banks and financial companies, the uncontested 
winners are bound to be the commercial banks. Surely competition is 
increasing for them as for everyone else, but so are the stakes of competition. 
New fields of activity are being opened up in all venues of finance, allowing 
the commercial banks to restore their prior market shares. Institutional 
investors, notably investment and mutual funds, should also be obvious 
winners. In contrast, all the banks that benefited from the postwar regulatory 
apparatus (nonprofit banks, state banks, local banks, and securities houses) are 
slated to lose. Not all commercial banks should benefit equally, though, as the 
commercial-non-commercial line of cleavage is bisected by another, pitting 
large against small financial firms. Small commercial banks may end up 
absorbed by larger ones, whereas a handful of large securities houses and 
investment banks of high repute also have the means to buy commercial banks. 
Large size in finance unequivocally translates into central location. Large 
banks are headquartered in financial centers, along with security houses, 
brokers, and institutional investors.
In the case of non-financial corporations, it is size also that is likely to 
determine the relative gains and losses from free finance - the potential 
winners are the large firms, whereas the losers are the small and medium-size 
companies. The latter are firms that are too large to expand on the sole basis of 
internal funding (the owners’ wealth), yet too small to enable market investors 
to evaluate their earning potential with a modicum of confidence; they must 




























































































from small-business loans, because such loans are transaction-specific and are 
unmarketable.37
Small-firm districts are threatened because small firms in general are 
threatened, and also because economies of agglomeration favor more 
concentrated at the expense of less concentrated regional economies. 
Furthermore, deregulation and unrestrained competition are harmful to 
industrial districts. Jonathan Zeitlin argues that industrial districts depend on 
public goods (vocational training, price and wage regulation, marketing 
facilities, quality normalization, and access to capital) which are not provided 
by market mechanisms.38 In his study of Britain, Zeitlin points to the 
disappearance of regional banking as a cause for the disappearance of small 
firms and industrial districts.39
Table 1 recapitulates the potential distortions associated with the 
mounting competition in financial and product markets. The winners tend to be 
the big and the centered; the losers, the small and the local. What emerges from 
Table 1 is a three-tiered center-periphery model of distribution of gains and 
losses. The financial center is home to profit center banks and large securities 
houses, institutional investors, and large firms, all potential winners of free 
trade and free finance. A second tier of regional industrial centers is home to 
large firms and densely-populated metropolitan regions, financed by a mixed 
group of center-bank branches and local banks. What this intermediate tier 
could potentially lose to the center, it could recoup it from the tier below. The 
third tier is essentially composed of potential losers, including local banks, 
savings banks, cooperatives, and traditional small-firm districts.
TABLE 1
P o ten tia l W in n e r s  a n d  L o sers
fro m  th e  G r o w in g  C o m p e tit io n  in  F in a n c ia l a n d  P r o d u c t  M a rk e ts
WINNERS LOSERS
large center profit banks, savings banks and coops,
FINANCIAL mortgage banks,
SECTOR institutional investors, small investment banks,
large securities houses small securities houses
NON-FIN ANCIAL large firms small firms




























































































The potential losers are not necessarily condemned but have a choice between 
two options: (1) they may defer to market forces, take a loss, and reinvest what 
is left into a winning line of business. For instance, many savings and 
mortgage banks in Australia and Britain, including the British Post Office 
savings bank, have forsaken their non-profit status to become commercial 
banks or subsidiaries thereof.40 In the same vein, the privatization of savings 
banks and Lander-owned Landesbanken has been debated in Germany. The 
effect of privatization is to re-orient the bank activity away from the local 
economy toward the national and world markets.41 (2) Alternatively, the 
potential losers may decide to challenge the verdict of the market in the 
political realm and seek state protection for their existing business. What the 
potential losers choose should depend on the relative expected costs and 
benefits of each option, a calculation that should also include the potential 
winners’ possible counter-responses.
Political parties do not figure among the political channels available to 
potential losers. With perhaps the exception of the United States, all party 
systems in OECD countries were formed during the interwar and immediate 
postwar periods at the peak of the class struggle. Today, these party systems 
are still cleft by the class cleavage - the moderate right is less dependent on 
unionized labor support than the moderate left. Yet, as I argued in the prior 
section, the class cleavage offers little grasp on the redistributional issues 
triggered by financial globalization. In practice, the European Left is as much 
supportive of financial globalization as the Right.42 There is a centripetal 
consensus (not shared by the partisan extremes) that redistribution ought not to 
interfere with market efficiency in general, and with financial market 
efficiency in particular. This does not mean that the Left-Right partisan 
conflict is absent from the globalization debate altogether, only that its focus is 
shifted from the issue of resistance to that of indemnification. The Left may be 
better able to indemnify the losers of financial globalization than the Right, but 
equally willing to let them lose in the first place.43
Although neither the working-class Left nor the capitalist Right may see 
themselves as the natural champions of the claims expressed by the small and 
the local, it may be that the sheer electoral size of that grouping would be 
sufficient to entice both the Left and the Right to court their support by 
articulating the antiglobal rhetoric. This does not seem to be the case, however. 
Paradoxically, the very decline of the class cleavage has weakened the 
electoral power of the small and the local. The alignment of the Right-Left 
partisan fight along the worker-capitalist cleavage some hundred years ago




























































































created unique opportunities for groups without prior affiliation to either of the 
two main protagonists. In many countries, farmers boosted their market fortune 
by forming iron-and-rye coalitions with capitalists in the late 19lh century and 
then red-green coalitions with the Left from the 1930s on. Artisans, small 
merchants and manufacturers, and workers on their own account were also 
coveted by the Right to fight the political battles of big business and by the 
I.eft to stem the tide of nationalist, anti-democratic movements. More 
generally, partisan polarization thinned the ranks of the unorganized median 
voters, thereby enhancing the intermediate groups’ leverage. In the last 
decades, however, de-industrialization, the embourgeoisement of the working 
class, and the weakening of trade unions and other intermediate groups have 
weakened the class cleavage and turned electoral politics into a specie of 
Downs’ (1957) median voting model, with voter normally distributed, a sizable 
floating vote, and policy convergence around pro-market policies. The 
electoral leverage previously enjoyed by the small and local bourgeoisies was 
diluted. The small and the local lost their strategic position at the center of the 
political spectrum. The only national parties to be responsive to their 
antiglobal plea, today, are populist parties - the French Front National, the 
Austrian Freedom Party, the Norwegian Progress Party, and the Australian One 
Nation Party, to name a few.44 These parties have racial, extremist overtones 
that condemn them to remaining in the opposition - a rather unattractive option 
for small firms and small districts looking for concrete measures.45
Like political parties, national trade associations are equally unlikely to 
articulate the local banks’, small firms’, and small districts’ concerns. With 
regard to banks, the end to the mandatory specialization of intermediaries by 
maturity, type of business, and location, allows financial institutions to sell 
products in all financial sectors (commercial, savings, mortgages, securities, 
and insurance), thereby causing the largest players in each sector to engage in 
cross-sectoral diversification and defect from past sectorwide strategy. With 
respect to non-financial firms, national trade associations are good at lobbying 
for policy ends that are shared by all ther members of a given sector, such as 
tariffs, NTBs, or sectoral subsidies. They are unable to deal with the divisive 
issue of financial globalization.
Central government agencies are also unlikely to be responsive to the 
small and the local’s pleas - assuming, of course, that those scattered groups 
could act collectively at such a centralized level. Most of these agencies gain 
from financial internationalization. The growth of the domestic and 
international bond markets provides treasuries with the possibility of 
refinancing the public debt at optimal conditions, nowadays that central banks 




























































































low interest rates. Also, deregulation has freed the regulatory agencies of the 
central government from past capture by professional associations and local 
agencies.46 In the field of banking, de-segmentation allowed the banks' 
regulator, the central bank (the FED in the United States), to extend its 
regulatory authority to the entire banking sector. Central government agencies 
are the obvious allies of the potential winners of globalization.
Rather than central political institutions (parties, national trade 
associations, and government agencies), the potential losers of financial 
internationalization are more likely to turn toward subnational levels of 
government. There are two main reasons. First, political success requires 
collective action, which, for scattered groups, is more plausible at the level of 
the local government than at the national level. Second, most local 
governments oppose free finance. With perhaps the exception of those that 
host large companies, local governments tend to lose from a financial 
globalization that increases the centralization of financial markets and 
dispossesses local agencies from their regulatory powers. Free finance reduces 
local control over local resources.
Not all local governments are evenly apt to make the nonmarket option 
attractive to the small and the local, however. This is especially so in countries 
with traditionally centralized state institutions, in which local governments 
have no representation of their own and are no match to central agencies. The 
situation is different in decentralized systems, in which the legislative branch 
of central governments is often bicameral with one of the two chambers 
structured to represent local governments or local citizens qua local citizens. 
Local governments in decentralized systems have the power to veto 
deregulation or force a compromise recognizing their claims. This is true both 
at the national level and, in the case of the fifteen OECD countries that are part 
of the EU, at the EU Council and Commission level.47 What local governments 
cannot do is check deregulation through the market or the courts.48
Two additional traits make lobbying local governments in decentralized 
countries by the potential losers of free finance worth their while. Only in 
decentralized states, first, do we find local governments already enjoying a 
well-supplied local financial market. Having something to defend makes the 
veto power a more effective tool than if new legislation was required. Local 
governments in decentralized countries can achieve their political goals by 
threatening merely to freeze the regulatory status quo - the tax and regulatory 
privileges enjoyed by the nonprofit and local banks, the obstacles to inter­
regional and international branching, the curbs to competition among regional 




























































































bank, which, again, only governments with a tradition of intervention in the 
local economy can manage to accomplish.
Second, local governments in decentralized countries are better able than 
their equivalents in centralized countries to circumvent - not solve - the 
problem of information asymmetry and attract outside capital. Generally, 
center banks will be more apt to overcome their aversion for lending to 
companies on which they have limited knowledge if they can secure some form 
of government guarantee against an eventual default. This guarantee may vary 
from a formal commitment by the central government to bail out defaulting 
borrowers, a covenant that is very difficult to extract, to a simple political 
pledge of not letting local economies down in a period of crisis, a promise that 
local politicians are usually quite willing to extend. In a centralized country, in 
which local economies are traditionally weak and a large section of small and 
medium-size enterprises quite often exist at the sufferance of the central 
government, the center banks will request no less than a formal guarantee from 
the central government before lending to small and local business. In a 
decentralized economy, in contrast, where small- and medium-size companies 
are plugged into local political networks, and in which local governments 
collectively exercise power in the central government, the need to extract such 
a guarantee for a bank is less pressing. The defaulting firm will be bailed out 
by the local government, and the fiscally-constrained local government in turn 
will receive help from the central government. In such a case, an informal 
commitment will prove generally sufficient both to encourage center banks to 
lend to local business and compromise these banks’ preferences for all-out 
globalism.50 Hence, one would expect the potential winners of globalization to 
be both less capable politically and less willing economically to pursue all-out 
globalization in decentralized than in centralized countries.
Summing up the argument, potential losers have a chance of stalling, or 
at least retarding, the trends that they anticipate to be harmful to them only in 
decentralized countries. Local governments in decentralized countries enjoy 
the requisite wherewithal’s: they have the regulatory and political power to 
defend local resources from being drained away to the financial center and 
therefrom to foreign markets; they also enjoy greater implicit political 
guarantees, leading center banks to lend to small firms to a greater extent than 
what open market relations would allow otherwise. In centralized countries, in 
contrast, the potential losers stand no chance to block a trend that has the 
support of the largest banks, firms, big cities, and the central government 
treasury at the very least. The theoretical claim is thus that governments in 
decentralized countries should be more likely, comparatively speaking, to 




























































































product markets but only partially in financial markets, whereas governments 
in centralized countries should lean toward all-out globalization.
Hypotheses and Evidence
The underlying model may be restated. The institutional makeup influences the 
outcome of political competition. State centralization makes the potential 
winners of globalization the likely winners of the political competition; 
decentralization, in contrast, gives an edge to the potential losers. The political 
competition determines the policy outcome, which, in turn, determines the 
relative market share of each camp, the relative importance between 
transaction-specific and marketable instruments, and the resulting degree of 
market openness. Graph 2 schematizes the main testable hypotheses. Not all of 
the eleven hypotheses represented there can be systematically tested. 
Quantitative data only exist for the institutional and market outcome variables 
(printed in bold). Nevertheless, I review the evidence available for each 




























































































































































































Hypotheses 1 and 2: According to these two hypotheses, coalition building 
and policy outcome vary according to the degree of state centralization. 
Coalition and policy are qualitative variables. I draw from existing case studies 
of financial deregulation. Financial deregulation has met political opposition in 
decentralized settings. The center-periphery cleavage is most visible in the 
U.S. and German cases - two decentralized countries. At issue in the United 
States, is the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, which prevents large commercial 
banks from expanding into the securities business. The three financial 
regulators (the FED, the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation) have consistently supported the New York and 
California banks’ demand for repeal, against the opposition of the smaller rural 
banks and their representatives in Congress.51 Although the latter have been 
unable to prevent the erosion of the Glass-Steagall prohibition through the 
market and the courts, they have successfully blocked all legislative initiatives 
in Congress, where they have the power to do so.
A similar center-periphery line-up surfaced in Germany about the reform 
of the German stock market which allowed Frankfurt to break loose from the 
cartel obligations that had bound it since the War to the seven other regional 
markets. The “Frankfurt Coalition” included no less than the Federal Finance 
Minister Waigel along with the four largest banks and Hessen (Frankfurt’s 
Lander) against all the other Lander?1 Eventually, in 1992, the Frankfurt 
coalition overcame the status quo, but at the price of a compromise recognizing 
the claims of the peripheral coalition.
In Italy - another decentralized country - Law 1/1991 on the financing of 
medium-sized firms, took a compromise position, providing both for the 
creation of local securities markets, a solution that was supported by the 
Chambers of Commerce and a number of regional trade associations, and the 
creation of a national over-the-counter market, the position that was 
championed by the Stock Exchange Council and the commercial banks.53
At no point did financial deregulation crystallize around a center- 
periphery cleavage in Britain and France - two centralized countries. In Britain, 
the deregulation of stock brokerage was promoted by the Bank of England and 
pitted the corporation of stockbrokers against commercial bankers, insurers, 
and trust and pension fund managers - all dwellers of The City.54 In France, the 
measure was imposed by the state, at times without consultation with banks.55 





























































































A true anomaly is the deregulation of brokerage in Canada. The 
Canadian debate proceeded along the center-periphery cleavage, pitting the 
provincial governments of Ontario and Québec against each other. But while 
Ontario - the financial center - was opposed to deregulation, Québec - a 
financial periphery - championed it. The large banks of both provinces rooted 
for the Québec government against the Ontario government. They won 
eventually - the Ontario security firms were bought-out by the banks.56
Hypotheses 3 and 9: The relative market power of the potential losers and 
winners of free finance should reflect government policy (hypothesis 3) and, 
therefore, state centralization (hypothesis 9), since government policy is a 
reflection of state centralization.
In the financial sector, considered first, one should expect the large 
commercial banks to gain market share at the expense of local and other banks. 
Further this trend should be more visible in centralized than in decentralized 
countries. I present systematic for both hypotheses. I measure the potential 
winners’ and losers’ market power by sorting banks into four categories: profit, 
nonprofit, state, and local:
(1) The profit banks are all the privately-held commercial banks. This category 
includes the commercial banks that were nationalized, which, for most of them, 
are now re-privatized, because they have consistently been run like any other 
profit-oriented bank irrespective of ownership. The central bank is left out of 
the typology altogether. All profit banks are center banks.
(2) The nonprofit banks, in contrast, are all local banks, or federations thereof. 
This category includes the savings banks, the credit cooperatives, the mortgage 
companies that are not managed by the state. Nonprofit banks benefit from 
legal privileges that allow them to compete with profit banks - they typically 
pay no (or less) taxes and usually enjoy a state guarantee on their deposits. 
During the postwar era, they were spared from reserve requirements in all 
countries but Germany.
(3) The state banks are the postal savings system, three national savings 
schemes (the British national savings accounts and the share of the French and 
Belgian national savings system that must be deposited with a central 
government fund), and the state-run credit banks. The state-run credit banks 
are not to be confused with the nationalized commercial banks. Whereas 
nationalization aims at redistributing bank profits, state banking aims at 
reallocating bank credit. State banks enjoy state borrowing privileges, unlike 




























































































other firm. State banks are usually specialized (one lends to local governments, 
another to farmers, still another to home owners, or small firms, or to firms in 
need of venture capital, etc.).57
(4) The local banks are profit-oriented commercial banks chartered by local 
governments. Instances of this category are only found in the U.S., Swiss, and, 
marginally, Australian federal systems.
This typology offers the advantages of being broadly comparative, affording 
long time series, and being useful in tracking the relative market power of the 
potential winners and losers of globalization - category 1 versus categories 2, 
3, and 4 combined.
Graph 3 shows the evolution of the relative market shares (calculated in 
assets) of each category per country. The profit banks continuously lost market 
share from the 1930s until the 1960s and regained it afterward in Australia, 
Belgium, Finland, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, 





























































































Assets of the Four Banking Sectors in % 1913-1995
A u s t r a l i a  A u s t r i a
90% 9m.
1930 190 1960 I960 1970
Denmark










04  —  
1910
Fin l and
: : x •-x "




























































































France G e r m a n y
J a p a n  N e t h e r l a n d s




























































































P o r t u g a l S p a i n
U n i t e d  K i n g d o m  U n i t e d  S t a t e s
N o te : P ro f it  b an k in g  sec to r: commercial banks regulated by the central government. 
N o n p ro fit ban k in g  s e c to r : savings banks, mutual credit societies, mortgage banks.
S ta te  ban k in g  sec to r: postal savings, all or part of the savings banks in France and 
Belgium, and state credit banks.
L o ca l ban k in g  sec to r: commercial banks regulated by local governments, such as State 
banks in the United States, and local and cantonal banks in Switzerland. The four 
sectors add up to unity.





























































































This U-shaped trend is not evenly pronounced across countries. It is not 
even visible in Canada, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Spain, and 
the United States. I use the multiple regression method to test whether the 
cross-sectional variation reflects state structure (hypothesis 9). The 
independent variable (state centralization) is measured by a fiscal proxy - the 
share of the central government in the appropriation of all governments’ 
revenues. Although imperfect - it probably underestimates Japanese 
centralization while overestimating Italian centralization - this proxy is the best 
one available (see Graph 4). The dependent variable is the market share of the 
profit banking sector. I perform an OLS regression on two different 
specifications of the dependent variable - its 1990 value and its change since 
1960 (simply done by controlling for the 1960 value of the dependent 
variable). These tests have a small N, ranging from 10 to 20 depending on the 
model, making them case sensitive - it takes but a few outliers to make or 
break a correlation. I compensate for this limitation by calculating the DFITS 
statistic - a measure of the degree to which each observation has a deviant 
residual or pulls the regression line toward itself. This allows me to identify 
potential outliers, some mild, some strong.581 then exclude these outliers from 
the regression and run the regression a second time. Because exclusion is a 

































































































1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
D a ta  D escrip tio n  a n d  S ou rces: The ratio is that of Centra] Government Receipts/(Central 
and Local Government Receipts - Transfers from Central to Local Governments). The sums 
transferred from the central to the local governments are subtracted from the denominator to 
avoid double counting. In some cases, the ratio was redefined as (Central Government 
Receipts - Social Security Contributions)/(Genera! Government Receipts - Social Security 
Contributions), with General Government including all forms of government. The second 
ratio was used for years prior to 1960 (Belgium, Canada, Finland, Germany, Greece, 
Portugal, Sweden, UK, USA), 1962 (Australia), 1963 (France), 1964 (Spain), 1968 
(Netherlands, Switzerland), 1970 (Ireland, Japan), 1971 (Austria), 1975 (Norway), 1983 
(Iceland, Korea), and throughout the period for which we have data in the case of New 





























































































Table 2 shows that both specifications of hypothesis 9 perform well provided 
that one controls for one additional variable - state banking - and make 
allowances for one outlier (Switzerland). There is a good reason for controlling 
for state banking. Historically, state centralization has had two contradictory 
effects on market centralization depending on the period considered. Until 
World War I, state centralization mostly worked against all forms of local 
banking (commercial and nonprofit), strengthening profit banking. In contrast, 
following the two wars, many centralized states (France, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand) established strong state banking sectors, with the 
effect of segmenting the credit market and, thus, weakening profit banks.59 
State banking peaked in the 1960s (reaching an average of 20 percent in our 
sample) and has been gently receding since (dropping to about 10 percent on 
average in the 1990s). But because this drop has not been uniform, it is 





























































































T h e  A sse t  S h a r e  o f  th e  P r o fit  B a n k in g  S e c to r  a s  a F u n c tio n  o f  S ta te  C e n tr a liz a tio i
(H y p o th e s is  9)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:
Asset Share of the Profit Banking Sector in 1990
normal normal excluding Switzerland
Regression Number i 2 3
Constant .21 .08 -.14
(1.34) (.45) (-.66)
Revenue Share of the .62 .49 .71
Central Government (2.80)** (2.11)* (2.82)**
1990
Asset Share of the Profit .40 .51
Banking Sector 1960 (171) (2.25)**
Asset Share of the State -.93 -.70 -.68
Banking Sector 1990 (-2.96)*** (-2.11)* (-2.21)**
Corrected R“ 40 .36 .49
Standard Error .1418 .1352 .1256
Number of observations 17“ Ï? 15c
OUTLIERS: strong*1 none none
milde none Switzerland
D a ta  D escrip tio n  a n d  S o u rces: For the dependent variable and the control variables, see 
Graph 3. For Revenue Share of the Central Government, see Graph 4.
N otes: Values of /-statistics are given in parentheses.
a Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA. 
b same as a excluding Ireland. 
c same as b excluding Switzerland.
d with a DFITS absolute value > sqrt(p), with p  the number of right-hand-side variables plus 
one.
e with a DFITS absolute value between sqrt(p) and 2*sqrt(p/n), with n the number of 
observations.
*,**,*** /-values significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Switzerland, in contrast, is a real outlier and a problematical case for the 
present theory. Switzerland features the most decentralized state structure (see 
Graph 3) along with an increasingly concentrated banking sector (see Graph 3 
above).60 Except for the Swiss case, hypothesis 9 linking market share to state 
structure in the banking sector is verified: centralization is correlated with both 
the change in market share of the profit sector over the 1960-1990 period 
(regression 3) and with its terminal value (regression 1).
It is more difficult to test hypothesis 9 with respect to non-financial 
firms. The prediction that small firms face relatively higher interest rates than 
large firms in centralized rather than decentralized countries cannot be tested. 




























































































by dividing interest payments to financial institutions by the stock of financial 
debt) are only available for five countries over ten years.61 Profit data are too 
ambiguous to serve as plausible proxy, for, besides being influenced by tax 
laws, lower profit for SMEs may either reflect hardship caused by 
globalization or, its opposite, since profits need not be as high for a company 
to attract external funding in a network-based system than in a market-based 
system.62 There is longitudinal evidence that small firms’ profits over time 
have declined relative to larger firms’ profits in Europe. Gross and net 
operating profit data for eleven E.U. member states show two distinct periods: 
small- and medium-size enterprises recorded better performance than larger 
enterprises before 1987-1988; the relation was reversed after 1988, with the 
gap increasing significantly in 1994-95.63 Such evidence is inconclusive, 
however, for the reversal may have nothing to do with the rise of free finance.
Hypotheses 4 and 10: The importance of transaction-specific relative to 
marketable instruments is a function of the tax and regulatory policies adopted 
by governments (hypothesis 4), and thus, by extension, of the relative degree 
of centralization of the state - centralization should be correlated with lower 
levels of bank intermediation, decentralization with higher levels thereof 
(hypothesis 10). There is hardly any doubt that hypothesis 4 holds; wherever 
governments have liberalized markets, reduced taxes on security gains, and 
stimulated the creation of pension funds, markets have grown at the expense of 
traditional banking. Only the more controversial hypothesis 10 needs testing. I 
use two different specifications of the dependent variable - bank 
intermediation and institutional investors’ economic weight. Bank 
intermediation measures the relative importance of loans in the financing of a 
sample of non-financial firms. It is a fraction having for numerator the amount 
of financial flows coming from bank loans and for denominator the total 
amount of financial flows. The ratio is a ten-year average (1978-1988). 
Retained earnings are taken out of the denominator because the relative weight 
of this post varies widely across countries for reasons having no apparent 
bearing on our hypothesis.64
Although bank intermediation provides a good measure of the 
importance of bank lending, bank lending does not fully overlap with the 
category transaction-specific instrument. Equity too can be used to cement 
long-term relations, as epitomized by the Japanese keiretsu and the French 
groupe. One needs a measure of equity holdings that excludes equity that is 
held merely for controlling purposes. The value of domestic shares held by 
institutional investors (insurance companies, investment funds, and pension 
funds) offers a close approximation of this concept. This value is calculated for 




























































































two other variables constant: (1) stock market capitalization, to clean the 
residuals from the predictable impact of sheer market size on institutional 
investors, and (2) the Anglo-Saxon tradition of market-orientation. Although 
the latter variable has shaky analytical credentials, it is an historical reality 
which, if left uncontrolled for, makes the results spurious.
The independent variable is the revenue share of the central 
government in 1980. The method is OLS. The N  is only 11. In both cases, the 
test bears on the 1990 (terminal) value of the dependent variable, not on its 
change over the preceding period, due to the lack of anterior data.
The results exhibit the expected negative relation between state 
centralization and intermediation provided that one treats Canada, but not 
Germany, as an outlier (regressions 4 and 5, Table 3). The bivariate 
scattergram (unreported) suggests that the Canadian observation is quite out of 
line with the other observations, a fact that is confirmed by regressions 4 and 5. 
Regression 4 includes Canada and generates weak and insignificant results; 
regression 5 excludes Canada and produces strong results. There is a good 
reason to treat Canada as an outlier. Canada has a credit market that is 
considerably more centralized than its state. Historically, the Canadian 
financial system was established under British rule in the first half of the 19lh 
century, reflecting London’s preference for centralization. Although quite 
centralized under British occupation as well, the Canadian state over time 
became a prototype of federal decentralization, a trend that brought along an 
equivalent decentralization of the credit market, but with a rather long lag - 
there still was a significant discrepancy between state structure and credit 
market structure in 1980 (contrast Graph 3 and 4 above). No such discrepancy 





























































































T h e  R e la tiv e  B a la n ce  B e tw ee n  T r a n s a c t io n -S p e c if ic  a n d  M a r k e ta b le  
In s tr u m en ts  a s  a F u n ctio n  o f  S ta te  C e n tr a liz a tio n  
(H y p o th e s is  10)



































Corrected R2 .13 .55 .85 .76
Standard Error .2146 .1530 .0736 .0595






Data Description and Sources: Bank loans is the simple average for non-financial enterprises of 
individual years' proportion of total financial flows coming from bank loans, recorded on a net 
basis, unweighted for inflation, over the period 1978-1988, except for Spain, for which the 
period is 1982-1988, and Belgium, for which it is 1985-1988; for details on the size of each 
country sample and further description of the raw data, see OECD Financial Statistics Part 3. 
various years. Institutional Investors is the value of domestic shares held by insurance 
companies, investment funds, and pension funds divided by GDP in 1990; for data on the 1990 
portfolio composition of institutional investors, see OECD 1997a, pp. 32-34; for data on GDP, 
see OECD National Accounts. Stock exchange capitalization is the value of domestic shares 
divided by GDP in 1989 for most countries, 1990 for Australia, France, Belgium the 
Netherlands, and Italy, 1991 for Denmark and Canada, and 1994 for Japan; for data on stock 
market capitalization, see OECD Financial Statistics Monthly, Section 2. various years. The 
datum for Germany was corrected to include the stock exchanges other than Frankfurt’s using 
Lutz's (1996, p, 13) estimate that the Frankfurt stock exchange alone covered almost 75 per cent 
of all stock market trading in 1990. For "Revenue Share of the Central Government,” see Graph 
4.
Notes: Values of r-statistics are given in parentheses.
* Austria, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, UK, USA. 
b Same as ‘ excluding Canada.
c Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA. 
dSame as c excluding the UK, Australia, and Japan.
e with a DF1TS absolute value > sqrt(p), with p  the number of right-hand-side variables plus one. 
f with a DF1TS absolute value between sqrtf/?) and 2*sqrt(y?/n), with n the number of 
observations.




























































































In contrast, a strong positive relation exists between state centralization 
and institutional investors’ economic weight, while controlling for market 
capitalization and Anglo-Saxon tradition (regression 6). Although the DFITS 
statistic diagnoses three potential cases of outliers (UK, Australia, and Japan), 
their exclusion from the regression does not significantly affect the results 
(regression 7).
Hypotheses 5 and 11: Hypothesis 5 suggests that countries that have taken 
regulatory steps to liberalize their credit markets are also those that are the 
most open to cross-border capital flows. Although non controversial and not 
worth the trouble it would take to put it to a rigorous test, hypothesis 5 implies 
the more counterintuitive hypothesis 11: there is a positive correlation between 
state centralization and financial openness - decentralized countries, such as 
the United States, should exhibit relatively un-globalized credit markets.
The prediction in part concurs with some of the European banking 
profession’s views. Anthony Smith writes that, following the 1992 
deregulation, the most open Community markets were expected to be those of 
the UK, Netherlands, Belgium, and France - all four highly centralized 
countries; the least accessible were expected to be those of Italy, Germany, and 
Spain - three decentralized countries.65
I offer a systematic test of hypothesis 11. The dependent variable 
(degree of financial globalization) is alternatively measured by international 
flows and bond activity. The first measure is gross inflows of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) weighted by GDP. Inflows are preferable to outflows, for the 
central aim of deregulation is to make domestic assets attractive to foreign 
investors. Gross flows are preferable to net flows, which are insignificant in 
most OECD countries, because advanced industrialized countries import about 
as much capital than they export.
Although the use of flows to measure financial interdependence has 
been criticized on the ground that, in a world of perfect capital mobility, rates 
of return would be the same everywhere and capital would then not move at 
all, the criticism seem irrelevant to the present era.66 First, greater integration 
causes international and national markets to be specialized - the former are 
wholesale markets, the latter retail - with the result that all large domestic 
transactions have an international counterpart, fueling cross-border capital 
flows. Second, risks are not perfectly correlated across countries, giving 
investors an incentive to diversify across countries and thus export capital. 




























































































country differences not just in treasury bond and money market rates, but also 
in investment opportunities. Were it not the case, one would not observe 
financial flows between New York and Chicago. And the lower the cost of 
moving capital, the more of it flows along existing information channels. 
Information channels, in the presence of integrated product markets, run along 
sectoral lines, across geographic borders.67 Therefore, the freer product and 
financial markets are, the more direct and portfolio investment should cross 
borders.
The use of FDI inflows is thus problematic for a different reason. It only 
measures direct, not portfolio, investment. I introduce a second measure of 
internationalization - the proportion of corporate bonds issued abroad.68 The 
numerator is the value of corporate bonds issued on the Euro- and foreign 
markets, whereas the denominator is the value of corporate bonds issued on all 
markets - Euro, foreign, and domestic.
A required control variable is the Anglo-Saxon tradition. The Anglo- 
Saxon head-start in the development of securities markets must be taken out of 
the dependent variable for its remaining variance to show the impact of 
globalization. Another necessary control variable is export dependence. 
Exporting a sizable proportion of its national product makes an economy a 
likely candidate for financial internationalization. Export dependence should 
also capture the variance in the dependent variable caused by the natural 
synergy existing between financial and trade openness, thereby allowing the 
other variables (the centralization variable and the Anglo-Saxon dummy) to 
capture the remaining variance - the one that is being theorized about here. A 
last control variable is country size, to guard against the risk that federal 
structure and low dependence on the world financial market are not a mere 
reflection of large size.
I first perform a series of cross-sectional OLS regressions at discrete 
points in time using FDI as dependent variable. The test is successively 
administered in the sixties, seventies, and eighties. Globalization being a recent 
phenomenon, the coefficient for the institutional variable and the Anglo-Saxon 
dummy should gain in significance over time. This expectation is borne out by 
the findings (see Table 4). High FDI inflows is correlated with none of the 
right-hand side variables in the sixties (regressions 8 and 9). Then, as 
globalization takes off in the seventies, all the variables become relevant, with 
the exception of size, and so remain in the eighties (regressions 10 to 13). Size 
is insignificant across specifications. Although there is no good reason to 
exclude the potential outliers in regression 8 and 10, exclusion has no impact 




























































































Such is not true of regression 12. To get a sense of what is happening. 1 
draw the partial regression plot for the institutional variable (see Graph 5).69 
The plot shows that Belgium is no real outlier, but Switzerland and Ireland are: 
Switzerland is an outlier for the same reasons as those developed when 
discussing the results of regression 2. Ireland is an outlier due to an exogenous 
shock in the dependent variable. Overall, hypothesis 11 seems to hold. 
Centralized institutions and the Anglo-Saxon market-oriented tradition favor 
financial globalization. More generally, product globalization and financial 
trade globalization are no surrogate. Although, the Export/GDP variable is 
correlated with the FDI/GDP variable in most regressions, the two variables do 
not overlap. They are not interchangeable proxies for globalization, but two 
dimensions of globalization between which state institutions, after controlling 
for Anglo-Saxon background, seem to drive a wedge.
TABLE 4
F in a n c ia l O p e n n e ss  a s a  F u n c tio n  o f  S ta te  C e n tr a liz a tio n  
(H y p o th e s is  11)
DEPENDENT
VARIABLE:
FDI Inflows Weighted by GDP International
Bonds
































































































































































TA B LE  4
F in a n c ia l O p e n n e ss  a s a  F u n c tio n  o f  S ta te  C en tr a liz a tio n  
(H y p o th es is  11)
DEPENDENT
VARIABLE:
FDI Inflows Weighted by GDP International
Bonds








Regression Number 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Capitalization c. 1989 (2.65)**

























Corrected R2 .12 .25 .84 .91 .19 .75 .39
Standard Error .0455 .0270 .0218 .0173 .0677 .0356 .1927















D a ta  D esc r ip tio n  a n d  S ou rces: FDI inflows is the cumulative inflows of direct investment weighted 
by GDP over the indicated period; see Graph 1. “Export/GDP” is the ratio of total exports to GDP 
averaged over the indicated period (OECD National Accounts). Log GDP is self-explanatory. 
International Bonds is a ratio with, for a given country, the value of Eurobonds and foreign bonds 
issued as numerator and the total amount of corporate bonds (Euro, foreign, and domestic) issued as 
denominator. The sources are OECD Financial Market Trends and Financial Statistics Monthly. All 
other variables are defined in Graph 4 and Tables 2 and 3.
N o tes:  Values of /-statistics are given in parentheses.
3 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, 
Norway, Spain, Sweden, UK, USA 
b Same as preceding column minus outliers.
c Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, UK, USA.
d Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA 
'Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, UK, USA. 
f with a DFlTS absolute value > sqrt(p), with p  the number of right-hand-side variables plus one 
g with a DFITS absolute value between sqrt(p) and 2*sqrt(p/n), with n the number of observations.




























































































c o e f  = .16419627, s e  = .09003252, t  = 1 .8 2
e( CENT_80 | X )
GRAPH 5: Partial Re. Plot, State Centralization Var, Re. 12, Ta. 4
I perform the same test, substituting international bond issues for FDI inflows 
(regression 14).70 Although the findings conform to expectations, they are 
plagued with a slew of potential outliers - a common occurrence in the 
presence of a very low N. The examination of the partial regression plot for the 
state centralization variable is more appropriate than a re-run of the regression 
without the problematic observations. Such examination (Graph 6) reveals no 
anomaly; surely the UK observation is pulling the regression line through 
itself, but the other countries are not so much out of line, so to speak, that the 
results should be dismissed as spurious. This last test shows that hypothesis 11 





























































































c o e f .87980039, s e  = .37716397, t  = 2 .3 3
GRAPH 6: Partial Re. Plot, State Centralization Var., Re. 14, Ta. 4
I overcome the potential outlier problem plaguing the low-A cross-sectional 
regressions 8-13 by performing a pooled time-series/cross-section analysis on 
15 countries over 25 years (N -  375). Preliminary tests (unreported here) 
indicated that the residuals are normally distributed (and the model, thus, 
correctly specified), but successively detected the three banes of groupwise 
heteroscedasticity, contemporaneous heteroscedasticity, and serial 
correlation.'1 The fact that the number of time periods (25) is greater than the 
number of panels (15) justifies the use of feasible generalized least squares 
(FGLS), correcting for the problems mentioned, serial correlation notably, 
through the use of an autoregressive (AR1) coefficient parameter for the error 
term common to all panels. Two variations of this model are run, one with 
Beck and Katz’s (1995) panel corrected standard errors, the other without, on 
the grounds that the number of time periods is such that either method could a 
priori be justified. To the variables already used in regressions 8-13,1 added a 
trend variable varying exponentially - (t-1969f, with 1 the year of the 
observation - to capture the overall growth in financial interdependence.
The findings confirm the statistical significance of all four variables (see 
Table 5). The coefficients are consistent and correctly signed across 
specifications. Although statistical significance is consistently lower with 
panel-corrected standard errors, it still reaches standard levels. Once again, 
product globalization is correlated with financial globalization but it leaves an 
unexplained residual - cases in which export-orientation and financial 




























































































controlling for the Anglo-Saxon tradition, this unexplained residual is 
consistently found to be correlated with state centralization.
TABLE 5
F D I In f lo w s  as a  F u n c tio n  o f  S ta te  C e n tr a liz a tio n . P o o le d  M o d e ls  
____________________________ (H y p o th e s is  11)____________________________
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: FDI Inflows Weighted by GDP









Revenue Share of the Central Government .010 .012
(5.39)*** (1.85)*
Log Likelihood 1915.743 1901.902
Chi2(4> 173.69*** 42.00***
No. of observations 375* 375*
D a ta  D e sc r ip tio n  a n d  S ou rces: The dependent variable is the yearly inflows of direct 
investment weighted by GDP. Trend equals ( t-1 9 6 9 )', with t  the observation year. All other 
variables are presented in Graph 4 and Tables 2-4.
Notes'. The method is Feasible Generalized Least Squares, correcting for heteroscedasticity 
and correlation across panels, as well as for a common AR (1) coefficient for all panels. The 
reported coefficient estimates are GLS estimates in regression 15 and Ordinary Least Squares 
estimates with panel-corrected standard errors in regression 16.Values of ^-statistics are 
given in parentheses.
a 15 countries over 25 years. The countries include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, UK, and 
USA The time period is 1970-1994.




























































































Hypothesis 6, 7, and 8: Market outcomes should be correlated with one 
another - a large profit sector should go hand in hand with a low level of bank 
intermediation and a high degree of financial openness. Correlation 
coefficients are calculated twice on the largest sample common to all variables, 
the first including the low-TV international bond variable, a second excluding 
this variable. All coefficients are above the 0.50 benchmark, except for that 
between intermediation and institutional investors, two measures of the relative 
importance of transaction-specific and marketable instruments which were 
deliberately selected for their complementarity rather than their similarity.
TABLE 6
P ea rso n  C o rre la tio n  C o e ffic ie n ts  B e tw ee n  M a r k e t  O u tc o m e s  
(H y p o th ese s  6 , 7 , a n d  8)




institutional investors .88 -.39
FDI inflows .76 -.52 .74
international bonds .92 -.58 .80 .74
N=11
intermediation -.66
institutional investors .85 -.38
FDI inflows .73 -.50 .74
D a ta  D esc r ip tio n  a n d  S ou rces: All variables are described in Graph 4 and Tables 2-5. The 
coefficients are calculated on the two largest common samples, the first one including the 
bond variable, the second excluding it. The countries included in the first sample are France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, UK, and USA; the countries included in the second 





























































































Free trade and free finance are no surrogate measures of globalization. 
Although free trade and free finance have in common the effect of increasing 
competition and compelling market actors to adopt new profit-maximizing 
strategies, these strategies radically differ - while firms adjust to globalization 
in product markets through product differentiation and flexible production, 
banks adjust to globalization in capital markets through product 
standardization and amalgamation. From this divergence results a mismatch 
between the supply and demand of financial instruments, with firms 
demanding more customized, specific instruments, and banks offering more 
standardized, marketable instruments.
This mismatch cannot be solved through the price mechanism but 
instead calls for a political solution. Several ones are a priori possible. First, 
governments may insist on free trade and free finance, pressing firms to 
acquire the size and visibility that would give them direct access to financial 
markets. Second, banks and firms could try to reduce investment uncertainty 
by restricting competition in product markets. A protectionist revival would 
reconcile firms’ demand with marketable financial instruments. Third, rather 
than free trade, governments may choose to discontinue free finance, thereby 
reducing financing uncertainty for banks and allowing them to customize their 
loans to the needs of firms producing for an open world market. Fourth, 
governments could dispose of both free trade and free finance.
The first option was pursued by Britain under the gold standard in 
response to a similar dual trend toward free trade and free finance with the 
dismal consequences for small and medium-size enterprises that Zeitlin has 
chronicled. It is also being followed nowadays by centralized countries with 
consequences that are still to be assessed. The second option was followed by 
the rest of the world under the gold standard. The role of banks such as J.-P. 
Morgan in the United States and the Grossbanken in Germany in cartelizing 
entire sectors of industry is well documented. The third option is being 
followed today by most decentralized countries. The fourth option was pursued 
by decentralized countries under the gold standard.72
Why are different options pursued in different periods and by different 
countries? This essay offers a partial answer to this question, one concerning 
free finance. The argument is that decentralized state structures empower the 
potential losers of free finance (the small and the local) enough to check its 
most undesirable effects. Centralized states, in contrast, empower the potential 




























































































argument is a step ahead of the current literature, which has paid little attention 
to the wide variation between countries, and although the present argument 
seems to find empirical support in both the gold standard and present periods, 
it remains a partial-equilibrium argument, holding trade politics constant in the 
determination of finance politics. Yet, the politics of trade and finance may be 
linked, and identifying the ways in which they are is a conceivable direction 
for future research.
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1 For comparisons of present levels of openness with those obtaining under the Gold 
Standard, see Bairoch 1996 and Zevin 1992.
2 In trade, domestic competition has preceded international competition by almost a century. 
In banking and finance, the two steps have been taken simultaneously, making them 
empirically indistinguishable. Domestic competition is a prerequisite for international 
competition, but the reverse is not true.
3 For a review of the literature, see Cohen 1996.
4 See, among others, Cox 1993, Gill and Law 1993, Goodman and Pauly 1993, O'Brien 
1992, Sinclair 1994, and Strange 1986.
5 See Boyer and Drache 1996, Cemy 1989, Coleman 1993, Deeg and Lutz 1996, Lutz 1996, 
Moran 1994, Sobel 1994.
6 Systematic cross-national analyses include Epstein and Schor 1992, Obstfeld 1995, and 
Quinn and Inclan 1997.
7 For existing works already pursuing this direction, see Frieden and Rogowski 1996, Garrett 
1995, and Haggard and Maxfield 1996.
8 Admittedly, one could model financial globalization differently, making it an exogenous 
trend while treating political institutions as an endogenous variable (see Frieden and 
Rogowski 1996). The present model is thought to be more desirable to study the politics of 
globalization because it magnifies the role of political institutions at the expense of economic 
endowments. For a more extensive discussion, see Verdier 1998, pp. 3-4.
9 The classic account is Riesser 1911, p. 725. On the more general role played by banks in 
monitoring firms’ investment, see Diamond 1984.
10 For Japan, see Aoki and Patrick 1995; for France, Hancke and Cieply 1996.
11 SeeBagnasco 1977; Herrigel 1996.
12 A third textbook case of network allocation of capital—spotted in France in the 1960s- 
1970s— is state banking. A state-banking network involves a local firm, the local 
representative, a local state official, and one or several central administrators. For references, 
see Verdier FORTH.
13 See Helleiner 1994, pp 88, 93. The Euromarkets became especially important in the 
recycling of the petrodollars following the oil shocks of the 1970s.
14 See Green 1997 and Davis 1995. For data on households' financial holdings covering 





























































































16 The conflicts of interests surrounding each “Big Bang" are chronicled, for Britain, by 
Moran 1994, for Japan, by Holt Dwyer 1997, for the U.S., by Sobel 1994, for Canada, by 
Harris 1996, for Australia, by Ackland and Harper 1992, for France, by Cemy 1989, and for 
Germany, by Liitz 1996.
17 I am not arguing that OECD bank profits have actually declined as a result of 
globalization—they did throughout the 1980s, and then recovered in the 1990s-—but that 
banks must change their financing and investment strategy in order to maintain past profit 
margins.
18 For instance, Deutsche Bank acquired Morgan-Grenfell, Dresdner acquired Kleinwort- 
Benson, Commerz acquired Hambro, ING acquired Barings, SPC acquired Warburg, Crédit 
Suisse acquired First Boston.
19 On the securitization of bank loans, see Thompson 1995.
20 For econometric evidence that the process of deregulation in OECD countries over the 
1981-1990 period has increased banking concentration, see Cerasi 1996. Cerasi argues that 
tougher competition leads to lower profits, driving many firms out of the industry and thus 
increasing concentration.
21 See Smith 1992, p. 137.
22 One should note, however, that some economists have argued that the very fact that a bank 
endorses a firm signals to others that the firm is worth investing. De Long (1991) has argued 
that reputation explained J.-P.Morgan’s success in placing bonds. These results either lack 
robustness (the signalling scenario is plagued with externalities, making no loans or multiple 
loans with no monitoring two additional and equally plausible equilibria) or admit of 
alternative interpretations (see Sabel’s emphasis on monopolistic control in his comments on 
De Long’s piece).
23 Porter 1992, p. 69. There are exceptions, involving U.S. public-employee funds; see Davis 
1995, p. 192.
24 For instance, Michael Porter writes that “pure costs advantages are more vulnerable 
because new product designs or other forms of differentiation can eliminate a cost advantage 
in delivering old ones” (1990, pp. 51, 64). Product differentiation is viewed by economists as 
the logical response to the profit uncertainty caused by the possibility of price competition. 
Hence, the greater the price competition, the greater the incentive for product differentiation. 
See Beath and Katsoulacos 1991, p. 6.
25 See Piore and Sabel 1984.
26 See Aoki 1988, Sabel 1989, and Cooke and Morgan 1994.




























































































28 See OECD 1995, p. 21.
29 Porter 1990, p. 158.
30 Krugman 1991.
31 See Dunning 1988.
32 See Deeg 1996, Sabel 1989, Saxenian 1994, and Storper 1995, p. 210.
33 Amin and Thrift 1992, p. 576.
34 Todtling 1994, p. 74.
35 There exists a broad literature on that issue. Partisans of the class (factor) taxonomy 
include Rogowski 1989, whereas supporters of the sectoral categorization include Magee 
1980, Frieden 1991, and Frieden and Rogowski 1995 among others. Alt and Gilligan 1994 
and Verdier 1995 investigate the conditions of application of each approach. Gilligan 1997 
rejects all cleavages, pointing instead to the firm as unit of political action. Most of this 
literature bears on trade and monetary policy. In banking, Maxfield 1990 points to a zero- 
sum game between the private and public banking sectors, while Deeg FORTH chronicles 
the secular rivalry between the profit and nonprofit banking sectors in Germany. The 
literature on capital mobility features authors who emphasize territorial rivalries (Krugman 
1991, Rogowski 1997) and authors who stress the labor-capital conflict (Garrett 1996, 
Rodrik 1997, Quinn and Inclan 1997).
36 See, among others, Kurzer (1993, p. viii), Cohen (1996, p. 286).
37 See Davis 1995, p. 171.
38 Zeitlin 1992, p. 290.
39 Zeitlin 1995, p. 105.
40 See Ackland and Harper 1992, p. 50.
41 The point about the nonprofit banks’ option to become more competitive is made by 
Richard Deeg (1996, p. 51).
42 For systematic evidence that the Left in general is as supportive of financial globalization 
as the Right, see Garrett 1995 and Quinn 1997. For a convincing argument for why this 
ought to be the case, see Rodrik 1997.
43 Not only are the two issues (resistance and indemnification) different, but they are not as 
closely linked as standard cost-benefit economics would expect them to be, given the 
constitutional incapacity of government (including the Left, since it cannot guarantee its re- 




























































































otherwise deemed as more efficient for society as a whole. On the tricky issue of government 
commitment, see Frieden and Rogowski 1996, p. 44.
44 See Mény 1998.
45 Populist parties are not to be confused with regionalist parties, such as the Italian L ega  
N o r d , the Belgian V olksunie, the B lo c  Q u éb éco is , and the Catalan and Basque parties, who 
tend to articulate the preferences of cosmopolitan individuals in extroverted, upwardly 
mobile regional economies. See Tossutti 1998. Although represented in national elections, 
these parties are mostly active in local governments.
46 See Moran 1994, and also Coleman 1993, Liitz 1996, and Cemy 1989.
47 On the importance of Brussels for sub-national governments and an assessment of the 
extent of their lobbying, see Marks, Nielsen, Ray and Salk 1997.
48 On the role of the courts in the gradual sidestepping of the Glass-Steagall ban, see 
Reinicke 1995, p. 102. On the more general role of the European Court of Justice in fostering 
“competitive regulation” between EU members, see Scharpf 1996.
49 Other conceivable blocking positions include the maintenance of the favorable tax 
treatment of debt against equity financing; the defense of the state-run social security system 
against the encroachments of private pension plans; the protection by law of company 
secrecy to the effect of maintaining banks’ comparative advantage over markets as a source 
of finance; the maintenance of laws insuring close bank-firm relations—for instance, laws 
recognizing creditors a say in management.
50 Even though such a commitment would be hard to keep in the event of a severe and drawn 
out business downturn.
51 See Reinicke 1995, pp. 57-123.
52 See Lutz 1996.
53 See Mondello 1994, p. 198.
54 See Moran 1991, and Sobel 1994.
55 According to Cemy 1989, p. 183. Coleman (1993) offers a concurring opinion in his 
survey of French banking reforms.
56 See Harris 1996.
57 On state banking, see Verdier FORTH.
58 I use standard definitions of strong and mild. A strong potential outlier is one with a 
DIET'S value superior to what is known as the “high cutoff “point—the square root of p ,  with 




























































































DFITS statistics is situated between this high cutoff and the so-called “low cutoff’ point— 
2*square root of p /n , with n the number of cases. See Bollen and Jackman 1990.
59 See Verdier FORTH.
60 The outward orientation of Swiss banks is not new, but already existed in 1913.
61 In the BACH data bank; see European Commision 1997, p. 29. The OECD data bank does 
not differentiate companies by size.
62 Hence, net profit ratio has consistently been higher in the U.S. over the 1984-1995 period 
than in Europe or in Japan; see European Commission 1997, p. 24.
63 European Commission 1997, p. 22.
64 Cross-country variations in retained earnings usually reflect variations in firms’ profit 
strategy, in turn influenced by variations in tax treatment and ownership—insiders are 
generally more likely to plow the profits back into the company than outsiders.
65 Smith 1992, p. 154.
66 On measuring capital mobility, see Epstein and Schor 1992, Hallerberg and Clark 1997, 
Obstfeld 1995, and Quinn and Inclan 1997.
67 This paragraph draws from Krugman 1987, p. 126.
68 Data on equity are too sparse to be included.
69 The partial regression plot is, according to Bollen and Jackman (1990: 260) “the 
multivariate analog of the bivariate scattergram.” Each plot generates a coefficient and a fit 
that are equal to the coefficient and fit of the dependent variable against the chosen right- 
hand-side variable, while simultaneously controlling for the effect of the other right-hand- 
side variables on the dependent variable.
70 Data limitations restrict its calculation to 12 countries over the period 1990-1996.
71 The error terms being normally distributed, I used the Lagrange multiplier statistic to test 
the assumptions that the error term is homoscedastic and rejected it. Using likelihood ratio 
tests, I also found the assumptions of no contemporaneous correlation and no serial 
correlation violated.
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